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In civil disputes and criminal cases alike, the right to a fair process undoubtedly includes the 
right to be heard in court. This right may then extend backwards to include a right of access to 
court, as well as forwards, to include the courts’ duty to provide reasons for their decisions.  
While obvious denials of fair process may manifest themselves by an impediment arising during 
the court proceedings themselves prior to the pronouncement of the sentence, justice can go 
wrong in that respect already some time before the court phase
2
. Or at the forward end of 
proceedings, court decisions rendered might be fair decisions, but deficiencies in the court’s 
reasoning justifying the decision could still result in the process not being recognized as fair and 
reasonable. Deficiency of the reasoning can deprive a procedure of the quality of fairness 
regardless of the existence or non-existence of unexplained good reasons. This is illustrated by 
the ECHR’s Letellier v France case, which we shall present in the sequel.3 Related to the phase 
of a civil dispute preceding the court phase, interestingly the right of access to court may also be 
violated on account of reasons not being given, the non-availability of justification for some act 
that could otherwise be subjected to review in court, as illustrated by the more recent case of 
KMC v Hungary decided in Strasbourg.
4
  
Fair trial or due process are broad notions appearing in several constitutional documents
5
 and 
international conventions. Both the European Convention of Human Rights of 1950 (Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 6) and the Pact of San 
José of 1969 (American Convention of Human Rights, Article 8) are more specific: their 
respective articles relating to the fair trial requirement  speak about “hearing” by a tribunal, both 
in civil and criminal cases, as does the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (Article 
10), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (Article 14) and the Charter 
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of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Article 47). The right to be heard is also 
specifically guaranteed by the Basic Law of Germany and by the Federal Constitution of the 
Swiss Confederation, referring to this right in the same terms as “Anspruch auf rechtliches 
Gehör”6, and – less explicitly – by the Basic Law of Hungary7. The notion that fair process 
would have to include not only the right to be heard, but also the right to know the reasons of a 
decision, may be implicit in international human rights instruments and several constitutional 
texts, but it does appear explicitly in the Constitution of Belgium
8
 as well as in the Constitution 




Due process and reasonableness requirements are not limited to the trial phase proper of legal 
proceedings. In particular, decisions about pre-trial detention must respect certain norms of 
reasonableness or justification, which appear separately in several constitutions and international 
conventions. Requirements of reasonableness or justification regarding pre-trial detention are 
spelt out more or less explicitly in the Constitution of the United States (Fourth Amendment), the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 
5), the Pact of San José (American Convention of Human Rights, Article 7), the Basic Law of 
Germany (Article 104), and the Basic Law of Hungary (Article IV). 
 
It appears that when citizens are involved in disputes to be settled by public authority, in a 
process that can legitimately result in the determination of rights or obligations, in civil or 
criminal matters, then one of the first specific rights of each subject is the right to be heard, 
extending to all parties in the dispute (audiatur et altera pars). This is an informational right, a 
right of communication, and when such communication is subject to legal norms, the question of 
legal norms relative to communication in the opposite direction also arises. In another area of 
fundamental rights, the freedom to impart information and opinions, the recognition of this 
opposite direction of the right to communicate resulted   - historically rather late  - in the right of 
access to information being acknowledged as a component of freedom of expression. If access to 
information is part and parcel of the right to speak freely, then the right to be heard may also be 
expected to include a right to know. 
 
Reasons to justify pre-trial detention: Letellier v. France 
Article 5 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the 
Convention”) allows for pre-trial detention on reasonable suspicion of having committed an 
offence if detention is needed to ensure that the suspect will be tried in court
10
. Thus reasonable 
suspicion is not enough, detention must be a means to ensure that the suspect will be available 
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for trial. However, at the relevant time Article 144 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure 
(CCP) also used to allow pre-trial detention in a number of other circumstances, in particular, 
when it is “necessary to preserve public order from the disturbance caused by the offence”11. It 
seems that a public order clause so broadly formulated, when used alone to justify detention, 
would not prevent the detention from predictably constituting a violation of Article 5. In the 
Letellier case the public order clause was used in conjunction with the need to ensure presence at 
trial. In our opinion, as far as application of the Convention is concerned, use of the public order 
clause by a national court to justify pre-trial detention tends to weaken the court’s reasoning 
rather than reinforcing it, raising a suspicion of intent to punish before judgment. 
The background facts of the Letellier case are as follows. In 1985 Mrs Monique Letellier, a 
mother of eight children and operator of a bar-restaurant in La Varenne St-Hilaire in France,  
was living separately from her second husband, when he was murdered by Gérard Moysan on 6 
July 1985. Mrs Letellier, living at that time with another man, was taken into custody on 
suspicion of having incited to the murder of her separated husband.  
The investigating judge charged Mrs Letellier with being accessory to murder, then on 24 
December 1985 ordered her release pending trial, subject to court supervision. On appeal by the 
prosecutor the release order was set aside on 22 January 1986, and from that time on she 
remained in pre-trial detention until May 1988. She was thus in pre-trial detention altogether for 
almost three years, before in May 1988 she was tried, convicted and sentenced to three years of 
imprisonment. At that point she was free to go. 
After her release in December 1985 was set aside in January 1986, Mrs Letellier’s repeated 
requests for release were the subject of judicial examinations seven times, at various dates before 
her trial in May 1988. 
All the seven judicial reviews resulted in her detention being continued. The reasons named in 
those judicial decisions were few, they were explicit but completely general, and did not go into 
the details of her case at all. They were also consistent over time, indeed they were expressed in 
almost identical wording. In all the seven judicial reviews, the measure of court supervision - 
that was in place when she was on release between December 1985 and January 1986 - was 
simply called “inadequate” or “not effective” - “to ensure that she will appear for trial” or to 
counter the danger that “she may seek to evade”. In all the 7 judicial reviews, a single, very clear 
reason was given why “she may seek to evade”:  it was, without any further explanation clearly 
and solely, nothing else but the expected severity of her sentence. 
 
Public disturbance caused by the offence, which French criminal procedure allowed and still 
allows as a reason for pre-trial detention, was mentioned in five out of the seven decisions 
refusing her release pending trial, with no details given ever as to how the disturbance might 
manifest itself. Finally, an unspecified risk of interference with witnesses, and the indication that 
there would be strong evidence against her, were mentioned in half of those judicial decisions, 
given as reasons to keep the person charged in custody. 
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How did the ECHR assess the sufficiency of these reasons? If we look at the judgment of the 
Strasbourg court in the Letellier case, it becomes clear that the ECHR was concerned mainly not 
with the question of whether reasons to keep the accused in detention existed, but with the 
question of whether such reasons were explicitly given as part of the pre-trial judicial decisions 
in France, whether the judiciary satisfied their obligation to provide sufficient reasoning to 
justify the pre-trial detention. The assessment of the ECHR was that the reasoning of the French 
judiciary was insufficient, and this in itself resulted in unjustified restriction of liberty in 
violation of Article 5 of the Convention. 
 
The following appear then to be the lessons from the Letellier case. First of all, the existence of 
evidence against an accused person, while necessary to keep the accused in custody, is not in 
itself a sufficient reason to do so. Second, in a judicial review, stereotyped repetition of the 
reasons provided by a previous review is not considered sufficient, when the conditions – such as 
the motivation to abscond, or the possibility to affect evidence already gathered – are evolving 
with time. Third, in deliberations affecting the liberty of an individual, her personal 
circumstances must be addressed. Fourth, measures less restrictive of liberty, such as court 
supervision, should not be discarded without assessing the success of their previous application. 
Finally the ECHR was also critical of the vagueness of the French judiciary in referring to 
disturbance of public order, ignoring that the victim’s family never requested Mrs Letellier’s pre-
trial detention - even when they requested the pre-trial detention of Mr Moysan, whom Mrs 
Letellier was accused of inciting to murder. 
 
Article 5 of the Convention certainly does not allow for pre-trial detentions based on reasons 
unconnected either to preventing a criminal act, or to the prevention of escaping justice after its 
commission. Of the seven possible justifications for pre-trial detention that Article 144 of the 
French CCP presently allows,
12
 the first five are clearly related to ensuring that the case will be 
tried in court
13
, the sixth refers to crime prevention
14
 – and these are then compatible with the 
provisions of Article 5 of the Convention. The seventh possible justification of pre-trial detention 
in the CCP seems on the other hand to provide an entirely different rationale for limiting the 
liberty of the suspect, one that is independent of the need to ensure that the case be tried.
15
 It is 
indeed a survival in a milder form of the old public order clause already called upon in the 
reasoning of the French judiciary in refusing pre-trial release in the Letellier case, a reasoning 
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The right to know the reasons:  K.M.C. v. Hungary  
 
Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
guarantees the right to be heard in court. The Convention binds the states that signed it, court 
systems hearing legal disputes have to be maintained by these states, and the courts have to hear 
and adjudicate also those disputes that arise between a state and its own officials.  
Ms K.M.C. was a Hungarian civil servant whose employment at an environmental directorate 
was terminated in 2010. At that time, Section 8(1) of Act no. LVIII of 2010 on the Legal Status 
of Government Officials – no longer on the books - allowed for dismissals without having to 
provide the reasons. A civil servant dismissed could always file a lawsuit, but was a “meaningful 
action” conceivable in the absence of “any known position of the respondent employer”? The 
answer given by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in its judgment of 10 July 2012 
was negative. Also in Hungary, Constitutional Court decision no. 8/2011. (II.18.) AB annulled 
Section 8(1) of Act no. LVIII of 2010. The Constitutional Court relied partly on ECHR case law, 
and the ECHR also cited the Constitutional Court’s decision, as well as the EU Charter and the 
European Social Charter. Judge Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque of the ECHR, elaborating on the 
judgment in his concurring opinion and also referring to international labor law (ILO), summed 
up the violation of Article 6 of the Convention as a breach of Ms K.M.C.’s “rights to know the 
reasons for her dismissal and to have her dismissal fully assessed by an independent body”.  
The key dates are as follows. Section 8(1) of Act. no. LVIII of 2010 allowing dismissal of civil 
servants without providing reasons was in force from 6 July 2010. Ms K.M.C. was dismissed 
from government service on 27 September 2010. The time limit for challenging this decision in a 
Hungarian court expired on 26 October 2010. On 18 February 2011 the Constitutional Court 
annulled Section 8(1) of Act. no. LVIII of 2010. Ms K.M.C. applied to the ECHR in Strasbourg 
on 22 March  2011, claiming violation of the fair trial provisions of Article 6 of the Convention 
because “her dismissal could not be effectively challenged in court for want of reasons given by 
the employer” (emphasis added by me). The case was communicated to the Hungarian 
Government on 12 September 2011. In a judgment of 10 July 2012, Article 6 § 1 was 
unanimously held by the ECHR to have been violated, and the judgment became final on 19 
November 2012 (Case of K.M.C. v. Hungary, Second Section). 
The absence of reasons given in the applicant’s dismissal from government service, allowed by 
law, had a double effect in the dispute before the ECHR.  
Firstly, it resulted in the respondent Government’s inability to argue successfully for the non-
admissibility of the case at the ECHR. Article 35 § 1 of the Convention only allows the ECHR to 
deal with a case after the exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicant. The Government 
argued that domestic remedies were not exhausted, as the applicant did not take legal action 
before a Hungarian court. In the Government’s view, access to a court was not prevented by the 
employer not having to give reasons for the dismissal. The ECHR saw it otherwise, considering 
the possible action in a Hungarian court ineffective and therefore not required in order to satisfy 
the domestic remedy criterion of Article 35 § 1, because the dismissal’s “reasons were entirely 
unknown” to the applicant, and thus the domestic court action “could only have been a formal 
motion” (§ 28  of the ECHR judgment).   
Secondly, the absence of reasons given in the dismissal led directly to a determination of the 
violation of the fair trial requirement of Article 6 § 1. The ECHR, citing its previous case law, 
recalled that the Convention is designed to “guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory 
but rights that are practical and effective”. Further, according to the ECHR a “meaningful action” 
in court was “inconceivable” because “the employer was under no obligation to give any 
reasons”, and this amounted to “depriving the impugned right of action of all substance” (§§ 33-
34 of the judgment). The ECHR thus recognized a substantive right to know the reasons of 
decisions that are subject to be challenged in court. 
What was really damaging to the respondent Government’s position in the case is not merely the 
fact that an organ of the state failed to give reasons when terminating the employment of a civil 
servant, it was rather the authorization given by a law to withhold the reasons. From the logic of 
the ECHR’s decision on admissibility in the K.M.C. case it appears that the non-provision of 
reasons in a decision by an employer or by anyone else can be viewed as an obstacle to judicial 
review, rendering judicial remedies ineffective, and rendering the exhaustion of such remedies 
unnecessary before an application can be filed with the ECHR. From the logic of the decision on 
the merits of the case, it appears on the other hand that national legislation allowing the 
withholding of reasons in decisions affecting civil rights or obligations may amount to a state’s 
failure to ensure access to fair trial, and may thus lead - upon individual application - to the 
finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.  
